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Abstract 
 
 
The paper examines the determinants of international migration in the 
Philippines. Specifically, it looks at the relationship of trade and migration. It 
proposes an eclectic migration model and shows by regression analysis that goods and 
labor mobility are substitutes in the medium and long terms. In the short run, as 
economies expand due to market reforms, migration may still continue. Other 
determinants of international migration include the economic growth of the country 
and specific factors related to the destination countries like wage rates and the 
existence of networks. Political stability in the Philippines did not turn out to be 
significant. The key policy prescription is to continue with the economic reforms such 
as improving trade openness to increase the employment and income possibilities of 
the Filipino people. In the short run, government needs to ensure the protection and 
welfare of the overseas contract workers.   
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Executive Summary 
 
  
The paper tried to ascertain the determinants of international migration in the 
Philippines including its relation with trade variables.  Through data and regression 
analyses, the following conclusions were drawn: 
 
1. The growth of the economy still proved to be a major determinant of 
migration though this conclusion was derived without controlling for external 
factors.  When the external factors were included, only the trade variables and 
country-specific factors became relatively significant. The unique factors in 
each country may affect overseas labor migration like the existence of 
networks or the implicit policy of foreign labor accommodation.  
 
2. The financing constraint related to migration costs may not be binding in the 
Philippines, as various mechanisms are present to facilitate overseas 
migration.  These include employer’s advances for travel costs or support 
from networks both here and abroad.  
 
3. Trade and migration are substitutes but only with accelerated export growth.  
The ratio of trade to GDP showed a negative sign, implying that goods and 
labor mobility are substitutes. However, in both the aggregate and panel data 
regression analyses, a positive relationship between exports and the number of 
OCWs was derived, although squaring the volume of exports yielded a 
coefficient with a negative sign. This suggests that only through accelerated 
export expansion would migration slow down. It is clearly possible that trade 
and migration are complements during the adjustment phase of liberalization. 
The variable exports of OCW destination countries to the Philippines or 
imports by the Philippines from such countries was also found to be 
significant, with a negative sign.  Increasing imports are usually associated 
with economic expansion and thus with the slowing down of international 
migration.     
 
4. An alarming percentage of our OCWs are highly skilled workers.  The 
adequate supply of such workers is key to our “competitiveness” in inducing 
both foreign and domestic capital to invest within our shores. They are also 
important in expanding and sustaining economic growth.  Unless government 
is able to reverse the tide, our labor market for high skilled labor may soon 
become tight.  
 
The key policy prescription is to continue with the economic reforms such as 
improving trade openness so as to increase the employment and income 
possibilities of the Filipino workers. However in the short run, government has 
to rely on both commodity and labor exports to provide the impetus to growth 
and alleviate employment pressures. In this regard, government during this 
phase must be able to craft policies that will maintain certain types of skilled 
labor (e.g. engineers, software programmers and specialists) which are also 
needed for catalyzing economic expansion.  At the same time, government 
should also establish support and protective mechanisms for OCWs 
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susceptible to onerous labor contracts as migration continues during the early 
stages of economic expansion. 
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Trade Liberalization and International Migration: 
The Philippine Case ∗ 
 
 
Fernando T. Aldaba1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The long years of protectionism in the country had long been cited by various 
studies as a major factor for the country’s slow growth path in the past three decades. 
Trade liberalization was seen as an agent of growth and structural change leading to 
higher incomes and reallocation of production and consumption. Since the ‘80s, the 
Philippines has embarked on trade reforms through the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions and tariff reduction. These series of reforms had significantly reduced the 
average level of effective protection from 44% in 1983 to 24% in 1995. During the 
same period, however, an increasing number of Filipino workers left the country to 
seek better employment and higher wages in various parts of the world. Overseas 
contract workers officially deployed rose from 36,035 in 1976 to 747,696 in 1997. 
 
This trend appears to contradict the expected movements from theory. In his 
classic article International Trade and Factor Mobility, Nobel prize winner Robert 
Mundell proposed that “Commodity movements are at least to some extent a 
substitute for factor movements.” Theoretically he showed that an increase in trade 
impediments encouraged factor movements under certain assumptions. In view of 
current developments, this paper aims to examine empirically whether trade and 
international migration are complements or substitutes using Philippine data. It also 
reviews the major factors for overseas migration in the Philippines using econometric 
analyses. Finally, it examines the role of trade liberalization—whether it helped to 
reduce or decrease international migration during the past ten years.  
 
The research is significant given the important role overseas contract workers 
(OCWs) play in the Philippine economy. Recent studies have shown that in the 
developing world, international labor mobility will continue to increase as a response 
to increasing income differentials globally. For a developing country like the 
Philippines, remittances have provided the much-needed dollars to the economy. On 
the other hand, continued increases in overseas workers deployed may have 
deleterious effects on the local labor market. This may result in the shortage of a 
skilled workforce needed to sustain economic growth. The study hopes to enlighten 
policy makers on the relationship of exports and the migration of workers. The 
current focus of government intervention necessary in creating and maintaining the 
level of human resources drastically can be determined. 
 
                                                          
∗This study was made possible through a research grant from the Philippine APEC Study Center Network (PASCN). 
1 Executive Director of the Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Assistant Professor, Economics Department, 
Ateneo University. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Pauline Rebucas in the data gathering and of Philip 
Arnold Tuano in the household data regression.   
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The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides an overview of the 
literature tackling trade and international migration; Section III discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the determinants of migration and of the 
“substitutability” of goods and labor exports; Section IV examines Philippine data on 
international migration; Section V focuses on the various regression analyses 
conducted to determine the significant factors affecting international migration; 
Section VI tackles the labor market effects of continued international migration; and, 
finally, Section VII summarizes the findings and elaborates on the policy implication 
of the study. 
 
Jurado and Sanchez (1998) discuss the importance of “temporary labor 
migration” (TLM) or international migration to the country’s employment levels. In 
their study, migration and labor data was reorganized, resulting in an increase of 0.2 
percentage points in the employment rate. The study also estimated that every TLM 
family or household would be receiving P80,000 per annum from a relative working 
abroad, increasing average real wages for the Philippines. According to the study, 
“the only way to deal with TLM is to decisively improve the economy so that TLMs 
can persuade themselves that it is in their interest to come home.” Presumably, trade 
liberalization, as it expands the economy and increases employment and wages, 
would be able to reduce the number of TLMs.  
 
Alburo (1993) analyzes the relationships between trade, remittances from 
OCWs, and the domestic economy. He cites the previous protectionist policies and 
weakness of the domestic economy as the driving force for international migration. 
Remittances from OCWs are used only in a limited manner for real and productive 
investments. He concludes that the Philippines is still far from turning points in trade 
and labor migration unlike South Korea and Thailand. Amjad (1996), who likewise 
does a comparative analysis of the Philippines and Indonesia, also comes up with a 
similar conclusion for both countries, basically because of the domestic economies’ 
failure to generate sufficient jobs for their respective populace. Alburo (1998) 
computes the ratio of merchandise exports to remittances for the Philippines, Thailand 
and South Korea. The estimates he gathered for the latter two countries tend to 
support the argument that there is substitution between goods exports and labor 
exports, because as trade accelerates, the apparent social returns (the ratio) from 
exports rise relative to migration. However, in the case of the Philippines, the ratio 
even fell from 11.7 in 1978 to 5.1 in 1993, the latest year of his estimation.   
 
Nevertheless, there are clearly other factors affecting international migration. 
Gonzales (1998) provides an integrated and comprehensive evaluation of Philippine 
labor migration from the following dimensions: historical, demographic, social, 
psycho-social, economic and political. In his book he also discusses policy 
implementation challenges and areas for further Philippine transmigration policy 
research. He presents both qualitative and quantitative information gathered from a 
wide array of primary and secondary resources. 
 
Bohning (1998) also identifies the factors that reduce Filipinos’ employment 
opportunities in countries affected by the current crisis and then carries out two 
rounds of simulation to estimate the orders of magnitude involved. The first round 
consists of simple employment elasticity exercise while the second accounts for 
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anticipated sectoral, occupational, and other impacts. According to the estimates, 
some 45,600 Filipinos working abroad will be affected because of the crisis, most of 
whom will come from Malaysia (32,500). Lim (1998), in his paper on the social 
impact of the crisis in the Philippines, notes that there is increasing pressure among 
OCWs to send bigger remittances due to the declining household incomes in the local 
economy. 
 
 Massey et al. (1993) provides a more comprehensive view of migration in his 
review of the various theories of international migration which include the micro- and 
macro-explanations of neo-classical economics (e.g., Lewis, 1954, Ranis and Fei, 
1961, Harris and Todaro, 1970 Todaro, 1976 and Borjas, 1990), the “new economics 
of migration” (e.g., Stark, 1991; Taylor, 1986; Lauby and Stark, 1988; Katz and 
Stark, 1988), dual labor market theory (e.g., Piore, 1979), world systems theory (e.g., 
Wallerstein, 1974), network theory, and institutions theory. 
  
Neo-classical economics focuses on an individual’s decision to migrate based 
on differentials in wages and employment conditions between countries and on 
migration costs. The “new economics of migration,” on the other hand, factors in the 
situation in various markets, not only labor markets. It looks at migration as a 
household decision to minimize risks to family income or to overcome capital 
constraints. Dual labor market theory and world systems theory do not consider such 
micro-level decision processes but emphasize the forces working at higher levels of 
aggregation. The former links immigration to the structural requirements of modern 
industrial economies while the latter views it as a natural consequence of economic 
globalization and market penetration across national boundaries. Network and 
institutions theory describes the role of relatives, friends, and institutions in 
facilitating and maintaining the flow of migrants from one country to another. 
 
 Nevertheless, Schiff (1994) shows that trade liberalization in either the 
sending or receiving country is likely to increase migration in the long run, although 
in the short term the effect is ambiguous. This varies from the typical Hecksher-Ohlin 
(H-O) conclusion that trade is a substitute for migration. In such a framework, trade 
liberalization by reducing price differentials between factors leads to a decline in 
international migration. Schiff (1994) utilizes the same H-O framework but adds 
migration costs and financing constraints to the model, causing divergence as a result.  
 
Martin (1993) proposes that there is a migration analog to the well-known 
demographic transition. Just as a country’s population temporarily grows faster when 
death rates fall before birth rates, so an established labor migration swells temporarily 
as a country restructures for accelerated economic growth. In economies that fail to 
adopt outward-oriented and market-driven economic policies, economic growth will 
slow down and emigration pressures will be accentuated by increasing demographic 
trends. In addition, Martin (1993) also looks at the trade-enhancing effects of 
migration, aside from being substitutes or complements. For example, he discusses 
that the U.S., as the world’s first “universal nation,” will be able to use diverse 
immigrants to forge trade links to their countries of origin. Thus, immigration is able 
to increase trade possibilities. Also, a portion of all remittances by these workers are 
spent on imports, thereby increasing trade.  
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Schiff (1996) studied particular cases to determine the relationship between 
trade and South-North migration. Opening markets in the North and providing foreign 
investment and foreign aid to sending countries are more likely to slow down 
migration from Eastern Europe to the European Union than from Africa to the 
European Union, or from Latin America to the United States. According to Schiff, 
two results hold irrespective of the degree of internalization of migration externalities: 
the South gains from trade liberalization in either the North or South and the North 
gains from imposing an immigration tax. 
 
Schiff and Lopez (1995) add four factors to the standard H-O model—labor 
skill levels (skilled or unskilled), international labor mobility, migration costs and 
financing constraints. They examined two types of simulation—case 1 to countries in 
the post-demographic transition stage with a stable population (e.g., Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union) and case 2 to countries with rapidly growing 
populations (e.g., Egypt, El Salvador, Mexico and Morocco). In case 1, trade 
liberalization raises emigration of the unskilled while protection raises emigration of 
the skilled. Thus, trade liberalization improves the average skill level of the labor 
force and increased protection lowers it. In case 2, trade liberalization raises 
emigration of the unskilled and reduces emigration of the skilled. The average skill 
level rises though the net effect on total emigration is ambiguous. 
  
Alburo (1994) examines the relationship between trade and migration for three 
Asian countries—Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, utilizing three 
methodologies: (1) a comparison of graphic representations of trade and migration 
flows; (2) testing a statistical relationship between trade and migration; (3) a 
comparison of revealed comparative advantage for goods with that of services. His 
conclusions show the existence of turning points where a country shifts from being an 
exporter to an importer of labor.  
 
II. Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Substitution between Migration and Trade in the H-O Framework 
  
From the 2X2X2 Hecksher-Ohlin Framework, trade and international factor 
mobility are substitutes in the sense that either achieves the same world equilibrium 
and that an increase in one lowers the other. The H-O model, coupled with the 
assumption of the North (South) being abundant in capital (labor), provides a useful 
analytical framework for explaining North-South trade. If international labor mobility 
is assumed further, substitution between trade and migration occurs as trade 
liberalization in either countries leads to more trade and as the North-South wage 
differential is reduced to less migration (Schiff, 1997). 
 
Decreasing restrictions in the trading of goods (i.e., commodity liberalization 
in either the sending or destination country or both) will no longer make labor 
mobility necessary, since the demand for goods and prices increase in the sending 
economy. The economic expansion resulting from this situation eventually leads to 
increase in employment and incomes, thereby decreasing international migration.  
However, liberalization in the sending country may increase unemployment in the 
short run, as uncompetitive sectors are weeded out during the adjustment phase, 
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triggering more human resource outflows. This is consistent with the “migration 
transition” of Martin (1993). Thus, at a certain stage in a country’s economic history, 
trade and migration may become temporary complements. This period of adjustment 
may be long or short depending on whether a country is able to implement the 
necessary trade reforms. In the long run, though, the economic expansion brought 
about by liberalization will decrease migration as nationals begin to find better jobs 
and higher wages in their own country.   
 
Complementarity Under Certain Assumptions 
 
 Schiff (1997) nevertheless contends that if some of the assumptions 
underlying the H-O model are changed, trade and migration may be complements. 
Complementarity between migration and trade obtains if one imposes identical factor 
endowments in both countries but relaxes one of the following assumptions: a) 
constant returns to scale, b) identical technologies, c) perfect competition, d) absence 
of domestic distortions. As such, free trade does not result in factor price equalization. 
For example, several studies have obtained varying results when an economies of 
scale assumption is utilized. Some exhibit complementarity while others show 
ambiguity, depending on the specific model used. 
  
In addition, when one considers migration costs and financing constraints, 
complementarity may again be shown. Migration costs may be prohibitive and 
difficult to finance for new migrants in developing countries like the Philippines.  
According to Schiff (1997), migration costs include: a) travel costs; b) information 
costs on the safest and cheapest routes, jobs and housing opportunities; c) cost of 
obtaining various documents (passport, visa, work permits); d) cost of living in the 
destination country; e) costs paid to agents or brokers who bring the migrants from 
their origins to the destination country; and f) social and emotional costs. Potential 
migrants, according to Schiff, also have little or no collateral to access credit to 
finance the migration costs mentioned above. They usually have to rely on their 
savings or through other means to be able to migrate. These include subsidies from 
relatives or friends who are already in the destination countries or advance payments 
from which are deductible their future wages. The latter, though, are a major source of 
onerous and exploitative arrangements for the migrants. 
  
An H-O Model with Migration Costs and Financing Constraints  
 
Schiff (1998) proposes a one-period framework, assuming identical 
individuals in the South with the following wage relations: 
 
1) Wo < Ws < Wo + C     
2) Ws < Wn – C          
 
Where Ws is the actual wage in the South, Wo is the subsistence wage, C is the cost 
of migration, and Wn is the wage in the North. The South is relatively labor-abundant. 
Ws < Wn because of protection in one or both countries. Equation 2 suggests that 
labor in the South would like to migrate because their wage is less than that of the 
North, less migration cost. Equation 1 implies that the wage in the South is less than 
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the subsistence wage, plus the migration cost. This indicates that people cannot pay 
for migration costs, and thus migration cannot take place. 
  
If trade liberalization occurs in the South, Ws increases to Ws’.  If the South is 
small, Wn is unaffected. As long as trade is not fully liberalized in the South or, 
protection exists in the North, Ws’ remains less than Wn. There are three possibilities: 
 
1) Ws’ < Wo + C 
2) Wo + C < Ws’ < Wn – C 
3) Wn – C < Ws’ < Wn 
 
Under 1), the financing constraint continues to be binding and migration does 
not take place. In 2), migration can be financed and thus it occurs. And in 3), there is 
no incentive to migrate, as local wage is already high enough. Thus according to 
Schiff, in a developing economy, skilled workers are constrained by the North-South 
wage differential while the unskilled ones by migration costs. 
 
Alburo’s Turning Point Hypothesis 
 
The turning point hypothesis of Alburo (1996) states that trade and migration 
are substitutes as economic growth is sustained over the long run. As accelerated 
export expansion fuels economic growth, migration rates and actual remittances 
decrease. A country reaches a turning point where it is transformed from a labor-
exporting country to a labor-importing one. Alburo determines such turning points 
through a computed ratio of remittances and exports. However, implicit also in this 
hypothesis is the fact that in the short and medium run, a developing country like the 
Philippines may find its exports and remittances growing relatively at parallel rates as 
its growth strategy maximizes all opportunities to earn foreign exchange to cover its 
import and capital requirements. Martin (1993) also suggests that increased migration 
catalyzes human linkage and network among various sectors of the different 
countries, triggering more trade and foreign direct investments.  He adds that a 
portion of remittances are used to pay for imports or to finance export-oriented 
activities. In this sense, there is a stage in a developing economy where trade and 
migration are complements rather than substitutes. 
 
An Eclectic Migration Model 
 
From existing studies in the Philippines, the following are the key 
determinants of international migration: 
 
a) Expected income differential. Following the new economics of migration, 
as discussed in the survey of literature, expected income differentials play 
an important role in a worker’s decision to migrate from one geographical 
area to another. Thus, the key variables affecting international migration 
will be the Philippines’ employment rates, wage rates, and economic 
growth rates as compared to those of the destination countries. 
 
b) Travel and related costs. These refer to the required expenditures of a 
migrant worker to be able to work in another country such as application 
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and processing fees, plane fares, and possibly start-up costs.  Recent 
changes in technology and greater competitiveness in the transport 
industry would have decreased these costs while inflation or the cost of 
money (and even exchange rate adjustments) automatically increases the 
cost of such expenditures. However, government policies (e.g., improved 
regulation of overseas employment agencies) may also affect these costs.  
 
c) Existence of networks. According to the literature, networks are defined as 
possible support systems provided by relatives, friends, or other 
institutions in the destination countries. The wider the network, the bigger 
the possibility of labor migrating to such a country.  
 
d) Political stability of a sending country. This is another important factor in 
migration. Various episodes in the country’s history showed migration 
rates increased as the political situation deteriorated. The 1983 crisis was a 
primary example, especially where it concerned the exit of the middle 
class and highly skilled labor during that segment of our history. 
 
e) Immigration rules in destination countries. The number of migrants is also 
determined by the openness of a certain country, whether explicit or 
implicit, to accept foreign labor. Countries with inadequate labor stock 
will tend to be more lenient with regard to working visas while others with 
excess supply will be relatively more strict. Alburo (1993) notes that in 
Asia, while many countries have strict migration policies, implicitly they 
allow undocumented workers to enter, as this type of labor is cheap and 
needed for the competitiveness of their industries.  
  
However, for the purpose of this study, an eclectic migration model is 
proposed. Several determinants of international migration in the Philippines may be 
lumped together in the following variables. 
 
a) Income variable. Given Schiff’s exposition on migration costs, this 
variable will tell us whether the financing constraint is binding or not. 
According to Schiff (1998), a positive sign is proof of the existence of this 
constraint. 
 
b) Economic condition variables. These are typical “push” factors that 
catalyze migration decisions. They may refer to a country’s economic 
growth, cost of living and unemployment situation. These variables are 
typically compared with those of the destination countries as inputs to the 
final decision making of an individual. 
 
c) Trade variables. Assuming these factors are fixed, these variables verify 
whether traded goods are substitutes or complements to international labor 
mobility. 
 
d) Political variables. These include political stability in the sending country, 
peace and order, and possibly immigration rules of host countries. Most of 
the time, they are very difficult to measure. 
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e) Social and cultural factor. These include the existence of networks in the 
receiving countries and the support mechanisms for the migrant in both the 
sending and destination countries. These variables typically cannot be 
measured.  
 
 
III. Data Analysis 
 
Data Sources 
 
Only available data on migration in the Philippines was utilized in the study. 
Data was gathered from the National Statistics Office (NSO), the Philippine Overseas 
Employment Agency (POEA), and other agencies dealing with international 
migration. An aggregate time series data was compiled from 1975 to 1998. Aside 
from using aggregate statistics, the study was also able to assemble disaggregated 
data particularly those relating to the number of overseas workers and their 
remittances from the top 11 destination countries (including the United States) from 
1990 to 1998.  These countries absorbed approximately 80% of all OCWs deployed in 
1997 and 1998. This study is therefore the first to analyze econometrically a panel 
data of migration statistics. 
 
Growth Rates of Migrant Workers, Remittances and Exports  
 
Table 1 shows OCWs deployed, yearly remittances, exports, GNP and GDP 
data in absolute terms from 1975 to 1997. In terms of migrant workers deployed per 
year, they increased 1,975% from 36,036 in 1975 to 747,696 in 1997. Remittances, on 
the other hand, jumped 5,474% from US$103,000.00 to US$5,741,835,000.00. Goods 
exported from the Philippines grew only tenfold from around US$2.2 billion in 1975 
to US$25 billion in 1997. 
 
Table 3 shows the growth rates per year of OCWs deployed, remittances made 
and goods exported. The rate of OCW deployment peaked at around 56% in 1980 
while the highest rate of increase in remittance (i.e., 78%) was recorded in 1978. 
Export growth registered 34% in 1979 and 29% in 1995. The average growth rate of 
migrant workers in 22 years is 16.5%, remittances 21.9%, and exports 12.2%. It is 
interesting to note that during the crisis years 1984, 1989, and 1990, the number of 
OCWs deployed even decreased. This may be due to the fact that travel and other 
migration costs had skyrocketed during those times. The only time remittances 
decreased was in 1984, the year after the Aquino assassination. 
 
Destination Countries 
 
 Table 4 shows the distribution of migrant workers among destination regions 
(i.e., Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, etc.). From 1984 to 1996, OCWs deployed in 
Asia noticeably increased almost four times, in Europe three times and in the 
Americas less than double. Over time, the number of migrant workers to Africa, 
Oceania and other Trust territories remained almost the same. In terms of land- and 
sea-based workers, the former increased by 30% and the latter by 250% in 13 years. 
For land-based workers, the regions whose economies experienced relatively high or 
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moderate growth rates over the said period attracted an increasing number of migrant 
workers like Asia, Europe, and the Americas. In terms of composition in 1996, about 
36% of land-based workers deployed went to Asia while 46% worked in the Middle 
East. In 1984, 84% went to the Middle East and only 12% landed jobs in Asia. Of the 
top ten destination countries, Saudi Arabia was still the top country of destination, 
followed by Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates.  
 
Exports/Remittances Ratio  
 
Table 2 shows that remittances per OCW deployed have increased over the 
years. In 1975 the average remittance was only US$2,858 per worker deployed, 
increasing more than double to US$7,679 in 1997. To determine whether we are 
approaching a turning point based on the analysis of Alburo (1998), we shall update 
his computations using his latest data in 1993. Table 2 shows that the ratio even 
decreased from 5.1 in 1993 to 4.39 in 1997. In the mid-70s, this ratio was already in 
the range of 19-23. Alburo (1998) argues that turning points occur only with sustained 
and accelerated growth rates of exports. In the case of the Philippines, trade reforms 
were seriously implemented only during the Ramos years. Exports started growing at 
a faster rate only in the mid-90s only to slow down again during the crisis. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Extending the Alburo Regression 
 
To date Alburo (1998) is the only study in the Philippines that has tried to 
examine the trade-migration relationship via statistical analysis. He regressed the 
following equation to test his turning point hypothesis:  
 
OCW = f (exports, exports2) for the years 1978-1991.  
 
However, the regression was beset with positive autocorrelation. His results showed 
that the variable exports squared (exports2) correlated negatively with the number of 
migrant workers and was statistically significant. Exports, on the other hand, was 
directly related to the number of OCWs deployed but was insignificant. We tried to 
run a similar regression for an extended time period from 1975 to 1997 and obtained 
the following results: 
 
Dependent Variable: OCWs Deployed 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) N=23 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant -159444.6 -2.450693 
Exports 104.3544 7.661806 
Exports2 -0.002878 -5.539408 
R2 = .855540            F-statistics = 59.223 
Adj R2 = .841094        Durbin Watson = .856128    
 
The above results are very similar to Alburo’s regression. The export variables 
are again statistically significant, though coefficient estimates may not be accurate 
due to first-level autocorrelation. Alburo (1998) uses these results as proof that rapid 
increases in exports eventually decrease migration. However, the other variable, 
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actual exports have a positive sign, which means that exports and the number of 
international migrants moved in the same direction for the past 23 years. 
 
Aggregate Determinants of International Migration in the Philippines 
  
The previous regression considered only the export variables as possible 
determinants of international migration. However, as was discussed in the eclectic 
model, there are various factors that tend to affect international labor mobility. The 
following empirical model tries to implement the eclectic model discussed above 
using aggregate data. 
 
Y = ßX + ∈, 
where  Y is the aggregate number of migrant workers deployed 
X is a matrix of determinants, which includes an income 
variable (real wage lagged one year), and economic situation 
variable (growth rate of GDP lagged one year; unemployment 
and inflation), trade variables (actual exports, ratio of total 
trade to GNP and effective protection rate), and political 
variables ( a dummy for political stability) 
       ß is a vector of coefficients and  
∈ is the error term. 
 
 The hypothesis is basically that “negative” economic indicators (i.e., low GDP 
growth rates and high unemployment and inflation rates) are correlated to decreases 
in migration. Trade variables (e.g., exports, exports squared, ratio of total trade to 
GDP, and effective protection rates) were included separately (the first regression 
included only the Alburo variables while the second regression used protection rates 
and the ratio of trade to GDP) to ascertain the relationship between trade and 
migration. A positive sign for the protection rate means that trade and migration are 
substitutes or that trade liberalization will result in less worker outflow. A negative 
sign for trade/GDP may also mean goods and labor are substitutes. For the variables 
exports and exports squared, the implication will rely on the signs and coefficients of 
both variables. For real wage, a positive sign means the financing constraint is 
binding, and therefore increased incomes may also increase migration. For the 
political dummy, a positive sign means political instability is correlated with greater 
migration. 
 
The following shows the result of the best estimation2: 
  
Dependent Variable: OCWs Deployed 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) N=22 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant 52065.05 .264574 
GDP growth rate -17179.29 -2.710617 
Real wage 
(1-year lag) 
13699.52 1.159348 
Effective protection rate3 -3632.275 -1.476681 
                                                          
2 Unemployment and inflation rates turned out to be statistically insignificant in previous runs. 
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Trade/GDP -30881258 -2.339967 
Exports 185.0708 3.601813 
Exports squared -.003054 -3.957992 
Political stability Dummy -29098.26 -.619146 
 R2 = .935           F-statistics = 29.188 
 Adj R2 = .90      Durbin Watson = 2.368   
  
An increasing GDP growth rate is correlated with a decrease in the number of 
migrant workers leaving the country. This is logical given the increasing opportunities 
for employment during an expansion phase of the economy.  Real wage has a positive 
sign but is statistically insignificant. Thus the financing constraint is not binding on 
the Philippines. This may be due to the fact that various mechanisms are present to 
assist the potential migrant in financing his or her migration costs. For example, 
employers usually advance travel costs to recruitment agencies, deductible from the 
future salary of the worker. Some of the costs may be financed by relatives, friends, 
and other benefactors in the informal network of the worker, both here and abroad.  
 
Total trade/GNP and the export variables also turn out to be significant. Total 
trade/GDP has a negative sign, implying that increased trade may decrease migration. 
This clearly means that trade liberalization will reduce worker mobility to other 
countries. The effective protection rate variable is not significant. However, for the 
exports variables, we get similar signs as in the Alburo regression. This validates the 
assertion that accelerating export growth reduces international labor mobility. The 
political stability variable does not affect overseas migration.  
 
A Panel Data Estimation  
 
The previous regression may be criticized because it lacked the so-called 
“pull” factors, since we dealt only with the domestic factors affecting workers 
outflow. In the next estimation, the author included external economic factors (i.e., 
growth, unemployment, and inflation in destination countries) that might affect the 
outflow of workers from the Philippines. In the estimation these factors were 
integrated into the unemployment, inflation, and GDP differentials between the 
Philippines and the various host countries. Exports to and from the Philippines were 
also used as regressors to substitute for “trade openness.”4 The following is the 
regression equation5: 
 
Y = ßX + ∈    
where   Y is the number of migrant workers deployed to a specific   
country; 
 X is a matrix of determinants including dummy variables for 
each country; 
       ß is a vector of coefficients; and 
 ∈ is the error term 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 This may be correlated with exports and trade/GDP. Dropping this variable does not alter the result. 
4 Another variable used was total trade of the Philippines to destination countries but turned out insignificant. 
5 The equation is constrained by the availability of data to represent key variables. 
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The differentials were computed as the Philippine rate less than the destination 
country rate. The following shows the results of the regression: 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of OCWs Deployed to the Destination Country 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) N = 70 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant -57314.7 -1.552932 
RP exports-host country 44.59672 3.219715 
RP-exports-host country2 -0.002076 -2.483718 
Host-country exports-RP -16.47850 -3.084225 
GDP differential -2.445356 -0.013405 
Unemployment differential 5446.654 1.226742 
 
Inflation differential 
268.1701 .355509 
D1 (KSArabia) 347744.3 6.905471 
D2 (Hong Kong SAR) 161441.4 4.202924 
D3 (Japan) 142945.7 4.138023 
D4 (UAE) 153002.8 3.237907 
D5 (Taiwan) 152795.9 3.693025 
D6 (Kuwait) 139651.5 2.933501 
D7 (Singapore) 114898.2 3.106225 
D8 (Qatar) 139147.2 2.801667 
D9 (Brunei) 112497.2 3.027774 
D10 (Italy) 72962.83 1.890034 
Time trend -3525.715 -1.527219 
R2 = ..942001           F-statistics = 49.68013 
Adj R2 = .923039     Durbin Watson = 1.095549   
  
Based on the above, all the “differential” variables turn out to be insignificant. 
However, the country-specific dummy variables controlling for fixed effects over 
time and across countries are all significant. This implies that other variables not 
explicitly specified in the model affecting movement toward these countries are 
relevant. One important variable is the average wage in these countries. In addition, 
immigration rules and the existence of networks are key factors that may affect 
migration to the eleven destination countries. These non-economic factors (e.g., 
political and cultural) have always been cited in the literature on OCWs in the 
Philippines. The Alburo variables (i.e., Philippine exports and exports squared to the 
destination countries) have similar signs as in the previous regression involving only 
internal variables. Both are statistically significant. The exports of destination 
countries to the Philippines also have significant coefficient and a negative sign. This 
means that increased imports by the Philippines tend to be correlated to decreases in 
migration. At first, this may seem to be the wrong sign. But upon further analysis, 
increased imports by the Philippines also mean economic expansion, as the 
destination countries include the United States and Japan, where most of our capital 
imports come from. From the results, one can conclude that greater trade openness 
that induces export and import growth may lead to reduced overseas migration. This 
is the same conclusion derived from the first regression. 
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A Household-Level Estimation 
  
The two previous regressions utilized aggregate and country-specific data on 
Philippine migration. In this estimation, the author used the Family Incomes 
Expenditure Survey household data to determine the effect of a trade liberalization 
regime on the migrant’s contribution to household per capita income. This was 
implemented by comparing the results of two regressions based on the 1991 (the pre-
liberalization regime) and the 1997 (the post-liberalization regime) data. The first 
regression was done by Edgard Rodriguez in an article entitled “International 
Migration and Income Distribution in the Philippines,” published in the Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. The same empirical model was utilized for the 
1997 data. The key variable to look at is a dummy for households with at least one 
remitting migrant. 
 
The following is a summary of the results: 
 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Household Income 
N = 24,782 (1991); 39,519 (1997) 
Variable 1991 FIES data (t-values) 1997 FIES data (t-values) 
Constant 8.543 (177.98) 9.302 (238.51) 
Household head   
 Age (years) .018 (9.00) .015 (7.50) 
 Age squared/100 -.017 (8.50) -.014 (7.00) 
 Primary eucation .233 (12.26) .195 (13.00) 
 High school education .515(25.75) .599 (37.44) 
 Tertiary education 1.104 (52.57) 1.188 (69.88) 
 Male    -.083 (5.19) -.124 (9.54) 
 Married6 -.004(0.25) -.025 (2.08) 
No. of children  
(< 15 years) 
-.177 (59.00) -.194 (97.00) 
No. of young adults 
(15-25) 
-.050 (16.67) -.044 (14.67) 
No. of adults (.25 years) .027 (5.40) .031 (7.75) 
Households with 
remitting migrants 
.418 (32.15) .334 (37.11) 
Urban (%) .299 (33.22) .397 (56.71) 
Adjusted R squared .44 .459 
F-Statistic 1622.27 2775.6 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values 
 
 From above, the coefficient of the dummy variable for remitting migrants 
decreased from its 1991 level. This implies that the share of remittances in household 
incomes declined after trade liberalization policies were implemented in the 
Philippines. The growth years after 1993 may have also increased the share of 
domestic sources in household incomes. Thus, trade and migration may indeed be 
substitutes as economic growth is accelerated by the export of goods due to trade 
reforms. 
 
                                                          
6 The only variable that does not turn out to be significant. 
  
17 
17 
V. Labor Market Effects of Continued International Migration 
 
While trade liberalization has been continuing in the Philippines, more 
reforms are needed to fully liberalize the trade sector. Other market- and sector-
related reforms (e.g., competition policy) are still necessary to sustain the current 
economic recovery. Governance should still be improved to facilitate such reforms 
and move the economy toward a higher-growth path. Thus, continued labor migration 
overseas in the next ten years may not be farfetched. In such a scenario, sustained 
worker outflow may have the following positive and negative effects on the economy: 
 
1) Reduction of unemployment and underemployment rates. As Jurado and 
Sanchez suggest, international labor migration alleviates the 
unemployment and underemployment problem in the Philippines. In 
addition, the income contribution of remittances has the typical 
consumption multiplier effects on the economy. However, remittances 
being transformed into investment expenditures are relatively small 
(Alburo 1994), as OCW families do not usually engage in entrepreneurial 
activities. Yet as the economic environment changes, remittances utilized 
for business may also increase. 
 
2) Skill shortages and decreases in productivity. The productivity of the 
relatively experienced workers who migrate cannot be fully replaced by 
new recruits and also, skill shortages coupled with wage increases may 
lead to the adoption of capital intensive technologies with adverse 
implications for future employment (Athukorala, 1993).  
 
3) Supply shortages. Still in terms of labor supply, certain types of labor may 
suffer some shortages (i.e., specialized skilled labor such as quality 
software makers) after continued overseas migration. In the long run, this 
situation will have tremendous effects on the labor market and the 
economy as a whole, since such types of labor are crucial to sustaining a 
growth momentum. Even key social services like health and education 
may suffer with continued skilled labor outflow7. Since current wage and 
salary differentials across countries are very wide, firm-specific remedies 
(i.e., efficiency wages) that address such a problem in the short run will 
not suffice, as these firms struggle to become competitive in a global 
economy. However, sustained economic expansion, if it occurs despite 
such labor constraints, may eventually lead to the return of such skilled 
professionals as what had occurred in Taiwan, South Korea, and even 
Malaysia. 
 
4) Loss of investments in human capital. The emigration of the more 
educated and experienced individuals is not merely a transfer of labor 
services but also of human capital; they carry with them investments in 
health, education, and nutrition. Thus the inadequacy of human capital in 
developing economies may even worsen (Lanzona, 1998) 
 
                                                          
7 The World Bank estimates that the number of physicians and nurses per 10,000 persons in the Philippines decreased from 7.3 to 
1.5 and 8.8 to 2.4, respectively, from 1965 to 1984.  
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5) Deterioration of social capital. Another important effect of worker 
outflow is related to social capital. As Schiff (1998) points out, social 
capital, like the family, is gravely affected by sustained migration. 
Philippine studies have also discussed such effects, especially on 
maintaining marriages and child rearing (Gonzales, 1998). Effects on 
social capital eventually translate into economic effects, particularly those 
related to productivity and the development of human capital. 
 
Table 8 shows the skill category of workers migrating to other countries from 
1992 to 1998. Around 25% to 30% of the OCWs were composed of professional, 
technical, administrative, and managerial workers. This fact more or less matches the 
1995 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) data on the highest 
educational attainment of overseas workers, indicating that while more than 40% 
reached college, graduates comprised only about 25% to 30% of the total. About the 
same percentage can be derived from the Commission on Filipino Overseas data on 
educational attainment from 1986 to 1996 (1996 Yearbook of Labor Statistics). 
Except for 1996, which was a year of relatively robust growth, the percentage of the 
relatively skilled workers to the total number of overseas migrant workers has been 
relatively stable at 25% to 35%. Economic theories suggest that skilled workers are 
relatively more mobile than unskilled ones. Thus, in economic crises, they are the first 
to get out of the country. See the following table for an elaboration of this assertion: 
 
 
Level of 
Education 
Reached 
OCWs in 
1995 
Percentage 
to total 
Emigrants 
in 1995 
Percentage 
to total 
Employed 
in RP in 
1996 (000) 
Percentage 
to total 
Elementary 90,782 11.6 10,016 17.8 11,209 41.2 
High 
school 
244,044 31.2 14,851 26.4 9,088 33.4 
Post 
secondary 
86,922 11.1 3,201 5.7   
College 342,929 43.8 22,288 39.6 5,966 22.0 
Post 
graduate 
2,942 0.5 1,265 2.3   
Others 14,671 1.8 4,638 8.2 924 3.4 
Total 782,297 100.0 56,259 100.0 27,186 100.0 
 
In 1996 only 22% of the employed labor force reached college. This means 
that the percentage of college-level workers leaving the country was greater than 
those actually employed. OCWs and emigrants who reached college comprise around 
40% or more of all those who leave the country. In a sense this implies that the 
Philippines is gradually losing an increasing percentage of its skilled workforce, 
assuming that such workers have reached college or post-secondary levels. The 
Economist even ranked the Philippines as the country with the third highest 
probability of having educated citizenry migrating and working overseas8. Unless our 
economy resumes its growth path, the exodus of our skilled workers will continue, 
especially in this era of globalization. However, sustaining our growth also requires 
                                                          
8 South Africa ranked first. 
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the availability of such skilled workers. Thus, government should start formulating 
policies that will entice these skilled individuals to return to their native land. 
 
Contrary to the “migration costs and financing constraint” hypothesis, which 
limits the migration possibilities of the relatively less skilled workers, workers who 
have reached elementary and high school levels comprise around 40% of the overseas 
contract workers. Thus, as mentioned in the previous chapters, certain mechanisms 
facilitate the migration of such relatively less skilled workers. However, these 
workers are also vulnerable to labor contracts that are oppressive and discriminatory 
because of their weak bargaining leverage. 
 
VII. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
  
The study tried to ascertain the determinants of international migration, including 
its relation with trade variables. From the data and regression analyses, the following 
conclusions are drawn: 
 
1) Among the internal factors that account for migration, the growth of the 
economy still proved to be a major determinant. (Other variables like inflation 
and unemployment did not turn out to be significant.) However, this 
conclusion was derived without regard for external factors. When the external 
factors were included, only the trade variables and country-specific factors 
became relatively more important. Thus, it is possible that unique factors in 
each country may affect overseas labor migration like the existence of 
networks or the implicit policy of foreign labor accommodation. The political 
stability dummy variable was also statistically insignificant. 
 
2) The financing constraint may not be binding on the Philippines, as various 
mechanisms are present to facilitate overseas migration. These include 
employers’ advances for travel costs or support from networks both here and 
abroad. Thus greater liberalization and economic growth may indeed stem 
migration trends in the long run.   
 
3) Trade and migration are substitutes but only with accelerated export growth. 
The ratio of trade to GDP showed a negative sign, thus implying that goods 
and labor mobility are substitutes. However, in the aggregate data regression 
analysis, a positive relationship between exports and the number of OCWs 
was derived, though squaring the volume of exports yielded a coefficient with 
a negative sign. This means that only through accelerated export expansion 
would migration slow down. The same result was obtained from the panel data 
estimation. Since actual exports are also positively related to the number of 
OCWs in both time series and panel data estimation, it is clearly possible that 
trade and migration are complements during the adjustment phase of 
liberalization. The other trade variables like the effective protection rate did 
not turn out to be significant. The variable exports of OCW destination 
countries to the Philippines (or imports by the Philippines from such 
countries) was also found to be significant with a negative sign. Increasing 
imports are usually associated with economic expansion and thus with the 
slowing down of international migration.   
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4) An alarming percentage of our OCWs are highly skilled workers. The 
adequate supply of such workers is key to our “competitiveness” in inducing 
both foreign and domestic capital to invest within our shores. They are also 
important in expanding and sustaining economic growth. Unless government 
is able to reverse the tide, our labor market for highly skilled labor may soon 
become tight.  
 
The key policy prescription is to continue with the economic reforms, such as 
improving trade openness, to increase the employment and income possibilities of 
the Filipino people. Trade liberalization, as it promotes labor-intensive export-
orientation, greater competition, and efficiency toward output growth in the 
economy, will reduce labor migration in the medium and long run. However, in 
the short run, government has to rely on both commodity and labor exports to 
provide the impetus to growth and alleviate employment pressures. In this regard, 
government during this phase must be able to craft policies that will maintain 
certain types of skilled labor (e.g., engineers, software programmers and 
specialists), which are also needed for catalyzing economic expansion. At the 
same time, government should establish support and protective mechanisms for 
OCWs susceptible to onerous labor contracts, as migration continues during the 
early stages of economic expansion. Sustained growth with higher incomes and 
very low unemployment rates will hopefully make the majority of Filipinos stay 
and work within the country, and lure back those who are employed abroad.  
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Table 1 
Migration, Trade and Growth Data 
      
YEAR OCW  REMITTANCES EXPORTS GNP GDP 
 Deployed (in US$ 000) (in US$ 000) (in US$ 000) (in US$ 000) 
1975 36,035 103,000 2,294,470 452,086,000 454,260,000 
1976 47,835 111,000 2,573,680 490,058,000 494,265,000 
1977 70,375 162,960 3,150,890 518,426,000 521,954,000 
1978 88,241 290,850 3,424,870 546,769,000 548,950,000 
1979 137,337 364,740 4,601,190 581,731,000 579,909,000 
1980 214,590 421,270 5,787,790 608,599,000 609,768,000 
1981 266,243 545,870 5,720,400 628,335,000 630,462,000 
1982 314,284 810,480 5,020,590 646,174,000 653,467,000 
1983 434,207 944,450 5,005,290 655,953,000 665,717,000 
1984 350,982 658,890 5,390,650 598,039,000 616,962,000 
1985 372,784 693,704 4,628,950 556,074,000 571,883,000 
1986 378,190 695,660 4,841,780 579,136,000 591,423,000 
1987 449,271 808,810 5,720,240 605,864,000 616,926,000 
1988 471,030 874,070 7,074,190 652,570,000 658,583,000 
1989 458,626 1,001,911 7,820,710 689,209,000 699,449,000 
1990 446,095 1,209,009 8,186,030 724,386,000 720,692,000 
1991 615,019 1,649,374 8,839,510 726,819,000 716,523,000 
1992 686,457 2,202,382 9,824,310 736,043,000 718,941,000 
1993 696,630 2,229,582 11,374,810 746,921,000 734,156,000 
1994 719,602 3,008,117 13,482,900 786,136,000 766,368,000 
1995 654,022 3,868,378 17,447,190 824,525,000 802,224,000 
1996 660,122 4,243,641 20,542,550 884,226,000 849,121,000 
1997 747,696 5,741,835 25,227,700 931,116,000 893,017,000 
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Table 2 
Exports-Remittances Ratio and Remittances per OCW 
   
YEAR EXPORTS/ REMITTANCES/ 
  REMITTANCES OCW DEPLOYED 
1975 22.27641 2858.332 
1976 23.18631 2320.477 
1977 19.33536 2315.595 
1978 11.77538 3296.087 
1979 12.61499 2655.803 
1980 13.73891 1963.139 
1981 10.47942 2050.27 
1982 6.194588 2578.814 
1983 5.299688 2175.115 
1984 8.181411 1877.276 
1985 6.672803 1860.874 
1986 6.95998 1839.446 
1987 7.072415 1800.272 
1988 8.093391 1855.657 
1989 7.805793 2184.593 
1990 6.770859 2710.205 
1991 5.359312 2681.826 
1992 4.460766 3208.332 
1993 5.101768 3200.524 
1994 4.482173 4180.251 
1995 4.510208 5914.752 
1996 4.840784 6428.571 
1997 4.393665 7679.371 
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Table 3 
Growth Rates of OCW, Remittances and Exports 
 
YEAR Growth Rate of OCW Growth Rate of Remittances Growth Rate of Exports 
  (in percent) (in percent) (in percent) 
1975     
1976 32.75 7.77 12.17 
1977 47.13 46.81 22.43 
1978 25.39 78.48 8.7 
1979 55.64 25.4 34.35 
1980 56.25 15.5 25.79 
1981 24.07 29.58 -1.16 
1982 18.04 48.47 -12.23 
1983 38.16 16.53 -0.3 
1984 -19.17 -30.24 7.7 
1985 6.21 5.28 -14.13 
1986 1.45 0.28 4.6 
1987 18.8 16.26 18.14 
1988 4.84 8.07 23.67 
1989 -2.63 14.62 10.55 
1990 -2.73 20.67 4.67 
1991 37.87 36.42 7.98 
1992 11.62 33.53 11.14 
1993 1.48 1.24 15.78 
1994 3.3 34.92 18.53 
1995 -9.11 28.6 29.4 
1996 0.93 9.7 17.74 
1997 13.27 35.3 22.81 
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Table 4 
  NUMBER OF DEPLOYED OVERSEAS FILIPINO WORKERS BY REGION OF DESTINATION (1984-1998) 
           
YEAR Land-based AFRICA AMERICAS ASIA EUROPE MIDDLE EAST OCEANIA TRUST Sea-based TOTAL 
             TERRITORIES   
1984 300,378 1,843 2,515 38,817 3,683 250,210 913 2,397 50,604 350,982 
1985 320,494 1,977 3,744 52,838 4,067 253,867 953 3,048 52,290 372,784 
1986 323,517 1,847 4,035 72,536 3,693 236,434 1,080 3,892 54,697 378,214 
1987 382,229 1,856 5,614 90,434 5,643 272,038 1,271 5,373 67,042 449,271 
1988 385,117 1,958 7,902 92,648 7,614 267,035 1,397 6,563 85,913 471,030 
1989 355,346 1,741 9,962 86,196 7,830 241,081 1,247 7,289 103,280 458,626 
1990 334,883 1,273 9,557 90,768 6,853 218,110 942 7,380 111,212 446,095 
1991 489,260 1,964 13,373 132,592 13,156 302,825 1,374 11,409 125,759 615,019 
1992 549,655 2,510 12,319 134,776 14,590 340,604 1,669 11,164 136,806 686,461 
1993 550,872 2,425 12,228 168,205 13,423 302,975 1,507 8,890 145,758 696,630 
1994 565,226 3,255 12,603 194,120 11,513 286,387 1,295 8,489 154,376 719,602 
1995 488,621 3,615 13,469 166,774 10,279 234,310 1,398 7,039 165,401 654,022 
1996 484,653 2,494 8,378 174,308 11,409 221,224 1,577 4,869 175,469 660,122 
1997 559,227 3,517 7,058 235,129 12,626 221,047 1,970 5,280 188,469 747,696 
1998 562,384 5,548 8,210 221,257 15,682 226,803 2,062 6,483 193,300 755,684 
SOURCE: POEA          
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                                                                                                                                                          Table 5 
                                                                                                                TOP TEN COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF DEPLOYMENT 
                                                                                                                                                         1984-1998 
            
 
YEAR KINGDOM OF HONG KONG JAPAN 
UNITED 
ARAB TAIWAN KUWAIT SINGAPORE QATAR BRUNEI ITALY UNITED 
  SAUDI ARABIA     EMIRATES             STATES 
1984 200,203 17,442 11,656 9,832 6 11,385 5,886 2,756 2,251 1,567 2,214 
1985 185,837 22,020 16,029 15,093 9 21,167 10,047 3,751 3,292 1,413 3,135 
1986 164,832 25,594 24,571 20,528 15 22,888 15,093 5,113 4,643 1,281 3,004 
1987 197,219 30,811 33,791 24,168 3 21,377 17,601 6,610 4,737 2,099 3,643 
1988 201,451 34,793 41,289 19,484 37 14,211 8,221 7,706 5,528 4,522 5,347 
1989 176,300 37,661 32,688 19,865 88 11,304 4,706 9,293 5,617 3,940 6,003 
1990 169,886 34,412 41,558 17,189 54 5,007 4,698 7,138 4,206 3,229 5,094 
1991 228,139 50,652 57,344 26,601 33 14,819 7,697 7,485 8,738 8,038 5,791 
1992 260,112 52,261 51,949 28,839 1,193 15,872 8,656 9,098 10,866 9,251 5,964 
1993 230,996 62,583 43,542 30,045 23,025 11,256 11,568 8,202 10,960 9,367 6,304 
1994 215,361 62,161 54,879 27,713 34,387 11,486 11,324 8,811 9,731 7,421 7,035 
1995 168,604 51,701 25,032 26,235 50,538 9,852 10,736 9,691 6,807 5,829 7,456 
1996 155,848 43,861 20,143 26,069 65,464 10,802 15,087 7,889 7,651 6,780 3,190 
1997 160,302 78,513 33,226 25,579 72,748 10,205 16,055 8,294 9,594 8,915 2,397 
1998 158,148 64,160 38,122 26,737 79,664 15,359 13,373 8,282 12,337 10,737 2,668 
TOTAL 2,715,090 668,625 525,819 343,977 327,264 206,990 160,748 110,119 106,958 84,389 69,245 
SOURCE: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration         
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
26 
26 
 
           Table 6          
Exports and Imports of the Philippines to and from the Countries Listed          
(in million of U.S. Dollars)               
     Exports           Imports   
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Saudi Arabia 64 59 57 68 59 64 55 63 620 690 874   740     994   1,719   1,630   1,809  
Hong Kong 330 392 464 546 651 822 868 1,153 577 614 721   879   1,146   1,374   1,343   2,430  
Japan 1,622 1,771 1,745 1,811 2,020 2,740 3,668 4,558 2,397 2,517 3,087  4,022   5,447   6,303   6,916   9,564  
United Arab                      
  Emirates 4 65 110 148 130 105 124 141 410 289 259   255     230     184    301     334  
Taiwan 209 210 287 346 452 568 661 1,250 835 854 960  1,031   1,270   1,537   1,582   2,471  
Kuwait 6 3 7 10 9 10 18 - 208 - 83   193     87      35     18      -   
Singapore 240 229 252 378 707 994 1,224 1,802 508 475 551   979   1,489   1,278   1,689   3,242  
Qatar 1 - - - 1 1 - 2 67 95 73    26     24      16      -       47  
Brunei 1 1 3 2 3 3 3 3 112 98 92    51     36      8      -       -   
Italy 61 78 100 84 90 111 94 111 94 106 120   136     179     244    292     439  
United States 3,104 3,151 3,843 4,342 5,178 6,217 6,966 9,816 2,538 2,610 2,626  3,532   4,162   5,225   6,243   8,170  
                 
    Total Trade            
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997         
Saudi Arabia 684 749 931 808 1,053 1,783 1,685 1,872         
Hong Kong 907 1,006 1,185 1,425 1,797 2,196 2,211 3,583         
Japan 4,019 4,288 4,832 5,833 7,467 9,043 10,584 14,122         
United Arab                 
  Emirates 414 354 369 403 360 289 425 475         
Taiwan 1,044 1,064 1,247 1,377 1,722 2,105 2,243 3,721         
Kuwait 214 3 90 203 96 45 36 -         
Singapore 748 704 803 1,357 2,196 2,272 2,913 5,044         
Qatar 68 95 73 26 25 17 - 49         
Brunei 113 99 95 53 39 11 3 3         
Italy 155 184 220 220 269 355 386 550         
United States 5,642 5,761 6,469 7,874 9,340 11,442 13,209 17,986         
SOURCE: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1998             
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                                                                                                                                                             Table 7 
                                                        Overseas Filipino Workers' Remittances by Country of Origin and by Type of Worker (1990-199) in Thousand U.S. Dollars 
 
COUNTRY/WORKER 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Saudi Arabia 86,604 100,883 145,644 160,981 100,846 1,027 14,515 5,723 33,433 
  Sea-based 309 173 1,348 46 46 292 - 328 1 
  Land-based 86,295 100,710 144,296 160,935 100,800 10,435 14,515 5,395 33,432 
Hong Kong 20,151 29,519 37,979 74,532 188,290 171,029 221,009 189,230 171,353 
  Sea-based 3,165 11,129 18,607 18,825 13,305 12,122 9,766 9,076 7,955 
  Land-based 16,986 18,390 19,372 55,707 174,985 158,907 211,243 180,154 163,398 
Japan 39,461 42,524 53,375 73,771 78,108 152,359 114,609 131,375 107,807 
  Sea-based 14,395 20,487 18,669 15,097 11,803 11,741 10,941 8,873 7,333 
  Land-based 25,066 22,037 34,706 58,674 66,305 140,618 103,668 122,502 100,474 
United Arab Emirates 37 7 138 751 1,654 1,081 2,745 2,385 2,508 
  Sea-based 1 - - 694 1,293 759 - - - 
  Land-based 36 7 138 57 361 322 2,745 2,385 2,508 
Taiwan - - - - - - 29,946 32,494 21,602 
  Sea-based - -     106 246 357 
  Land-based - -     29,840 32,248 21,245 
Kuwait 16,212 2,309 5,644 7,967 28,189 26,853 21,469 16,998 13,550 
  Sea-based 16 - - - - 20 - 25 - 
  Land-based 16,196 2,309 5,644 7,967 28,189 26,833 21,469 16,973 13,550 
Singapore 11,899 11,837 13,905 14,547 98,158 106,143 129,654 93,329 69,288 
  Sea-based 1,534 4,440 2,937 778 148 107 477 2,259 1,540 
  Land-based 10,365 7,397 10,968 13,769 98,010 106,036 129,177 91,070 67,748 
Qatar 425 281 208 333 76 589 401 260 102 
  Sea-based 6 - - - - - - - 1 
 Land-based 419 281 208 333 76 589 401 260 101 
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Table 7. Continuation 
 
COUNTRY/WORKER 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Brunei 835 283 202 242 30 2,255 931 5 35 
  Sea-based - - - - - - - - 2 
  Land-based 835 283 202 242 30 2,255 931 5 33 
Italy 863 8,867 25,993 35,877 63,216 39,617 40,617 49,396 54,464 
  Sea-based 28 20 36 38 48 85 40 25 1 
  Land-based 835 8,847 25,957 35,839 63,168 39,532 40,577 49,371 54,463 
United States 797,840 1,271,560 1,157,270 1,419,485 1,973,855 3,812,168 2,564,467 4,109,430 3,961,215 
  Sea-based 210,768 276,317 304,940 279,671 290,864 144,117 166,949 183,509 202,260 
  Land-based 587,072 995,243 852,330 1,139,814 1,682,991 3,668,051 2,397,518 3,925,921 3,758,955 
 
  Table 8      
Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers by Skill Category (1992 - 1998)      
        
SKILL CATEGORY 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Professional Technical and Related Workers 72,848 65,385 74,218 43,981 36,055 51,381 55,576 
Administrative and Managerial Workers 495 405 385 352 305 572 385 
Clerical and Related Workers 4,943 3,801 3,709 3,377 3,169 3,632 2,881 
Sales Workers 2,725 2,576 2,284 2,090 1,938 2,637 2,510 
Service Workers 82,443 89,154 90,967 81,318 84,745 76,644 80,917 
Agricultural, Animal Husbandry, Forestry Workers,         
   Fishermen and Hunters 1,920 1,706 1,204 972 822 546 388 
Production and Related Workers, Transport         
   Equipment Operators and Laborers 94,528 92,664 85,816 81,859 75,683 85,829 75,222 
Invalid Category/ Others Not Elsewhere Classified 692 506 403 200 3,074 - 1,367 
GRAND TOTAL 260,594 256,197 258,986 214,149 205,791 221,241 219,246 
SOURCE: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration        
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                                                                                                                                                  Table 9 
                                                                                    DESTINATION COUNTRIES AND RELEVANT ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
 
Country of Destination Number Remittances GDP Phil. GDP Diff. Unemployment Phil. Unem. Diff. Inflation 
and Year of OFWs (in thousand Growth Rate Growth Rate  Rate Rate  Rate 
  U.S. Dollars)        
          
Saudi Arabia          
1990 169,886 86,604 10.7 3 -7.7  9.5 9.5 2.1 
1991 228,139 100,883 8.4 -0.6 -9  10.5 10.5 4.6 
1992 260,112 145,644 2.8 0.3 -2.5  9.8 9.8 -0.4 
1993 230,996 160,981 -0.6 2.1 2.7  9.3 9.3 0.8 
1994 215,361 100,846 0.5 4.4 3.9  9.5 9.5 0.6 
1995 168,604 10,727 0.5 4.8 4.3  9.5 9.5 5 
1996 155,848 14,515 1.4 5.7 4.3  8.6 8.6 0.9 
1997 160,302 5,723 2.7 5.1 2.4  8.7 8.7 -0.5 
1998 158,148 33,433 2.1 2.5 0.4  10.1 10.1 0.3 
Hong Kong          
1990 34,412 20,151 3.4 3 -0.4 1.3 9.5 8.2 9.8 
1991 50,652 29,519 5.1 -0.6 -5.7 1.8 10.5 8.7 12 
1992 52,261 37,979 6.3 0.3 -6 2 9.8 7.8 9.4 
1993 62,583 74,532 6.1 2.1 -4 2 9.3 7.3 8.9 
1994 62,161 188,290 5.4 4.4 -1 1.9 9.5 7.6 8.8 
1995 51,701 171,029 3.9 4.8 0.9 3.2 9.5 6.3 9 
1996 43,861 221,009 4.9 5.7 0.8 2.8 8.6 5.8 5.2 
1997 78,513 189,230 5.3 5.1 -0.2 2.2 8.7 6.5 6.5 
1998 64,160 171,353 3 2.5 -0.5 2.5 10.1 7.6 4.5 
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Table 9. Continuation 
 
Country of Destination Number Remittances GDP Phil. GDP Diff. Unemployment Phil. Unem. Diff. Inflation 
and Year of OFWs (in thousand Growth Rate Growth Rate  Rate Rate  Rate 
  U.S. Dollars)        
          
Japan          
1990 41,558 39,461 5.1 3 -2.1 2.1 9.5 7.4 3.1 
1991 57,344 42,524 3.8 -0.6 -4.4 2.1 10.5 8.4 3.3 
1992 51,949 53,375 1 0.3 -0.7 2.2 9.8 7.6 1.7 
1993 43,542 73,771 0.3 2.1 1.8 2.5 9.3 6.8 1.2 
1994 54,879 78,108 0.6 4.4 3.8 2.9 9.5 6.6 0.7 
1995 25,032 152,359 1.5 4.8 3.3 3.1 9.5 6.4 -0.1 
1996 20,143 114,609 3.9 5.7 1.8 3.3 8.6 5.3 0.1 
1997 33,226 131,375 0.9 5.1 4.2 3.4 8.7 5.3 1.7 
1998 38,122 107,807  2.5 2.5 3.6 10.1 6.5 0.9 
United Arab Emirates          
1990 17,189 37 17.5 3 -14.5  9.5 9.5 0.6 
1991 26,601 7 0.2 -0.6 -0.8  10.5 10.5 5.5 
1992 28,839 138 2.7 0.3 -2.4  9.8 9.8 6.9 
1993 30,045 751 -0.9 2.1 3  9.3 9.3 5 
1994 27,713 1,654 2.2 4.4 2.2  9.5 9.5 3.9 
1995 26,235 1,081 6.1 4.8 -1.3  9.5 9.5 4.4 
1996 26,069 2,745 9.5 5.7 -3.8  8.6 8.6 3.6 
1997 25,579 2,385 3 5.1 2.1  8.7 8.7 4.4 
1998 26,737 2,508  2.5 2.5  10.1 10.1  
Taiwan          
1990 54  5.4 3 -2.4 1.6 9.5 7.9 4.1 
1991 33  7.6 -0.6 -8.2 1.4 10.5 9.1 3.6 
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Table 9. Continuation 
Country of Destination Number Remittances GDP Phil. GDP Diff. Unemployment Phil. Unem. Diff. Inflation 
and Year of OFWs (in thousand Growth Rate Growth Rate  Rate Rate  Rate 
  U.S. Dollars)        
1992 1,193  6.8 0.3 -6.5 1.5 9.8 8.3 4.5 
1993 23,025  6.3 2.1 -4.2 1.4 9.3 7.9 2.9 
1994 34,387  6.5 4.4 -2.1 1.5 9.5 8 4.1 
1995 50,538  6 4.8 -1.2 1.8 9.5 7.7 3.7 
1996 65,464 29,946 5.7 5.7  2.6 8.6 6 3.1 
1997 72,748 32,494 6.9 5.1 -1.8 2.7 8.7 6 1.1 
1998 79,664 21,602 5 2.5 -2.5 2.6 10.1 7.5 4 
Kuwait          
1990 5,007 16,212 -26.2 3 29.2  9.5 9.5 9.8 
1991 14,819 2,309 -41 -0.6 40.4  10.5 10.5 9.1 
1992 15,872 5,644 77.4 0.3 -77.1  9.8 9.8 -0.5 
1993 11,256 7,967 34.2 2.1 -32.1  9.3 9.3 0.4 
1994 11,486 28,189 8.4 4.4 -4  9.5 9.5 2.5 
1995 9,852 26,853 1 4.8 3.8  9.5 9.5 2.7 
1996 10,802 21,469 0.9 5.7 4.8  8.6 8.6 1.8 
1997 10,205 16,998 1.5 5.1 3.6  8.7 8.7 1.7 
1998 15,359 13,550 1.2 2.5 1.3  10.1 10.1 1.1 
Singapore          
1990 4,698 11,899 9 3 -6 1.7 9.5 7.8 3.4 
1991 7,697 11,837 7.3 -0.6 -7.9 1.9 10.5 8.6 3.4 
1992 8,656 13,905 6.2 0.3 -5.9 2.7 9.8 7.1 2.3 
1993 11,568 14,547 10.4 2.1 -8.3 2.7 9.3 6.6 2.2 
1994 11,324 98,158 10.5 4.4 -6.1 2.6 9.5 6.9  
1995 10,736 106,143 8.7 4.8 -3.9 2.7 9.5 6.8 1.7 
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Table 9. Continuation 
 
Country of Destination Number Remittances GDP Phil. GDP Diff. Unemployment Phil. Unem. Diff. Inflation 
and Year of OFWs (in thousand Growth Rate Growth Rate  Rate Rate  Rate 
  U.S. Dollars)        
1996 15,087 129,654 6.9 5.7 -1.2 3 8.6 5.6 1.4 
1997 16,055 93,329 7.8 5.1 -2.7 2.4 8.7 6.3 2 
1998 13,373 69,288 3.5 2.5 -1 3.3 10.1 6.8 2.5 
Qatar          
1990 7,138 425 -14.8 3 17.8  9.5 9.5 3 
1991 7,485 281 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2  10.5 10.5 4.4 
1992 9,098 208 9.3 0.3 -9.0  9.8 9.8 3.1 
1993 8,202 333 -0.4 2.1 2.5  9.3 9.3 -0.9 
1994 8,811 76 2.3 4.4 2.1  9.5 9.5 1.3 
1995 9,691 589 -1.1 4.8 5.9  9.5 9.5 3 
1996 7,889 401 10 5.7 -9  8.6 8.6 2.5 
1997 8,294 260 15.5 5.1 -10.4  8.7 8.7 2.6 
1998 8,282 102  2.5 2.5  10.1 10.1  
Brunei          
1990 4,206 835 2.7 3 0.3  9.5 9.5 2.1 
1991 8,738 283 4 -0.6 -4.6 0.7 10.5 5.8 1.6 
1992 10,866 202 -1.1 0.3 1.4 4.5 9.8 5.3 1.3 
1993 10,960 242 0.5 2.1 1.6 4.1 9.3 5.2 4.3 
1994 9,731 30 1.8 4.4 2.6 3.6 9.5 5.9 2.4 
1995 6,807 2,255 2 4.8 2.8 4.9 9.5 4.6 6 
1996 7,651 931 2.8 5.7 2.9 5 8.6 3.6 2 
1997 9,594 5 3.5 5.1 1.6  8.7 8.7 3 
1998 12,337 35  2.5 2.5  10.1 10.1  
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Table 9. Continuation 
Country of Destination Number Remittances GDP Phil. GDP Diff. Unemployment Phil. Unem. Diff. Inflation 
and Year of OFWs (in thousand Growth Rate Growth Rate  Rate Rate  Rate 
  U.S. Dollars)        
          
Italy          
1990 3,229 863 2.2 3 0.8 11 9.5 -1.5 6.5 
1991 8,038 8,867 1.1 -0.6 -1.7 10.9 10.5 -0.4 6.3 
1992 9,251 25,993 0.6 0.3 -0.3 10.7 9.8 -0.9 5.3 
1993 9,367 35,877 -1.2 2.1 3.3 10.2 9.3 -0.9 4.6 
1994 7,421 63,216 2.2 4.4 2.2 11.3 9.5 -1.8 4.1 
1995 5,829 39,617 2.9 4.8 1.9 12 9.5 -2.5 5.2 
1996 6,780 40,617 0.7 5.7 5 12.1 8.6 -3.5 3.9 
1997 8,915 49,396 1.5 5.1 3.6 12.3 8.7 -3.6 1.7 
1998 10,737 54,464 2.3 2.5 0.2 12 10.1 -1.9 1.8 
United States          
1990 5,094 797,840 1.2 3 1.8 5.6 9.5 3.9 5.4 
1991 5,791 1,271,560 -0.9 -0.6 0.3 6.8 10.5 3.7 4.2 
1992 5,964 1,157,270 2.7 0.3 -2.4 7.5 9.8 2.3 3 
1993 6,304 1,419,485 2.3 2.1 -0.2 6.9 9.3 2.4 3 
1994 7,035 1,973,855 3.5 4.4 0.9 6.1 9.5 3.4 2.6 
1995 7,456 3,812,168 2 4.8 2.8 5.6 9.5 3.9 2.8 
1996 3,190 2,564,467 2.8 5.7 2.9 5.4 8.6 3.2 2.9 
1997 2,397 4,109,430 3.8 5.1 1.3 4.9 8.7 3.8 2.3 
1998 2,668 3,961,215 2.9 2.5 -0.4 5 10.1 5.1 2 
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    Table 10     
REAL GDP PER CAPITA (1970 - 1997)        
YEAR SAUDI ARABIA HONG KONG JAPAN UNITED ARAB KUWAIT SINGAPORE ITALY UNITED STATES PHILIPPINES 
        EMIRATES           
1970 623.66 958.33 1,952.62  495.17 916.09 2,003.73 5,050.48 194.89 
1971 987.22 1,115.31 2,177.17  622.88 1,059.97 2,178.60 5,419.44 205.52 
1972 1,489.09 1,376.78 2,843.17 4,425.85 573.31 1,348.80 2,514.82 5,894.71 215.56 
1973 3,963.82 1,892.30 3,808.78 6,792.00 533.68 1,896.24 3,026.76 6,524.47 266.74 
1974 5,641.89 2,162.26 4,172.24 16,031.67 1,188.72 2,308.12 3,410.40 6,999.77 354.92 
1975 6,451.50 2,256.52 4,479.44 19,551.91 1,000.64 2,495.36 3,832.42 7,550.12 376.16 
1976 7,623.45 2,892.92 4,980.96 21,909.43 1,048.44 2,589.37 3,772.72 8,342.51 418.92 
1977 7,933.18 3,471.95 6,071.53 23,503.57 1,018.51 2,821.88 4,344.25 9,203.14 467.24 
1978 8,645.79 3,886.09 8,453.59 19,782.57 969.13 3,336.51 5,321.43 10,294.26 526.85 
1979 12,855.22 4,541.16 8,725.16 22,760.65 1,469.32 3,965.38 6,623.71 11,363.64 626.69 
1980 16,701.00 5,639.61 9,068.21 29,323.21 1,530.18 4,862.32 8,022.49 12,224.27 671.48 
1981 15,813.24 5,906.21 9,941.25 29,989.35 1,371.98 5,691.38 7,222.85 13,550.93 719.53 
1982 11,816.77 6,013.59 9,169.50 26,169.54 1,192.58 6,180.71 7,115.67 13,964.34 731.45 
1983 9,640.29 5,479.97 9,943.32 23,165.71 1,129.30 7,213.06 7,316.23 15,000.00 637.98 
1984 8,324.03 6,063.88 10,537.46 21,147.80 1,159.59 7,694.49 7,217.25 16,509.71 588.74 
1985 6,851.66 6,394.32 11,115.94 19,581.60 1,127.45 7,133.52 7,425.09 17,529.88 562.20 
1986 5,479.21 7,266.53 16,384.94 14,982.29 839.98 7,155.76 10,525.11 18,373.77 533.37 
1987 5,404.22 8,824.64 19,806.22 15,799.51 923.62 8,112.95 13,224.19 19,323.83 578.75 
1988 5,430.92 10,353.20 23,806.85 13,224.59 817.47 9,004.17 14,579.23 20,605.57 645.19 
1989 5,751.63 11,806.74 23,554.93 14,660.09 1,023.35 10,385.03 15,098.04 21,988.76 708.36 
1990 7,039.02 13,130.08 24,053.24 17,521.91  12,119.90 18,972.98 22,983.47 720.71 
1991 7,136.32 14,971.67 27,454.13 17,128.52  13,700.25 20,277.24 23,421.34 713.09 
1992 7,264.40 17,321.55 29,918.08 17,359.16 1,203.63 15,241.39 21,441.54 24,450.45 810.82 
1993 6,830.86 19,587.40 34,290.60 16,915.07 1,494.17 17,355.22 17,267.85 25,406.19 811.73 
1994 6,766.23 21,586.83 37,523.80 16,974.89 1,355.82 20,472.34 17,767.68 26,657.71 933.89 
1995 6,863.87 22,491.57 41,033.22 17,334.89 1,399.43 23,663.36 18,988.39 27,650.33 1,048.28 
1996 7,247.17 24,424.51 36,539.09 19,743.36 1,592.35 25,150.57 21,151.77 28,881.18 1,165.35 
1997 7,499.79 26,508.41 33,256.67  1,543.86 25,636.07 19,912.76 30,275.85 1,131.61 
1998   30,046.41   21,807.27  31,455.87 866.35 
          
SOURCE: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK 1999; IMF      
 
